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2009-11-07T20:07:00Z

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Woozle: moved Adaptive Behavior and Learning/Chapter 1 to Adaptive Behavior and Learning/contents/Chapter 1: main article should be about the book, with the contents in subpages

2009-11-07T17:41:25Z

moved Adaptive Behavior and Learning/Chapter 1 to Adaptive Behavior and Learning/contents/Chapter 1: main article should be about the book, with the contents in subpages

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Woozle: moved Adaptive Behavior and Learning: Chapter 1 to Adaptive Behavior and Learning/Chapter 1: reorganizing with subpages

2009-11-07T17:38:46Z

moved Adaptive Behavior and Learning: Chapter 1 to Adaptive Behavior and Learning/Chapter 1: reorganizing with subpages

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	[[Adaptive Behavior and Learning]]: [[{{PAGENAME}}\|Chapter 1]]		[[Adaptive Behavior and Learning]]: [[{{PAGENAME}}\|Chapter 1]]
			{{neededit\|"Smart" quotes and other characters did not import properly; italics need to be inserted manually. (Sections 1.1 & 1.2 have been fixed.)}}
	[http://psychweb.psych.duke.edu/department/jers/abl/Chapter01.pdf PDF]		[http://psychweb.psych.duke.edu/department/jers/abl/Chapter01.pdf PDF]

Woozle: /* Two kinds of explanation */ cleaned up smart characters; transcribed italics

2006-05-17T13:49:30Z

Two kinds of explanation: cleaned up smart characters; transcribed italics

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Woozle: /* Methodological behaviorism */ fixed "smart" characters

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 ==PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND==
 ===Methodological behaviorism===
-Animals and people seem to have purposes, beliefs, attitudes, and desires; they seem to
+Animals and people seem to have purposes, beliefs, attitudes, and desires; they seem to know some things and not others, to want some things and disdain others, and so on. These are what philosophers call intentional systems. Intentionality may seem to set psychology apart from the physical and biological sciences. After all, the chemist does not worry about the beliefs of his compounds nor is the physicist concerned about the purposes of protons or the quirks of quarks. Does this mean that psychology is not scientific? Does it mean that it is different in kind from the physical sciences? Not at all; the difference is in the richness of behavior of the things studied, their sensitivity to their environment, and the dependence of present behavior on past experience. The language of intentionality is simply the everyday way that we deal with complex historical systems. I typed the first edition of this book with the aid of a microcomputer that had an ancient operating system called "[[wikipedia:CP/M|CP/M]]." Look how the instruction manual refers to CP/M and its associated programs: "CP/M could not find a disk..." "PIP assumes that a... character" "CP/M does not know that..." "Seven commands are recognized by CP/M." No one assumes that there is a little man or woman, complete with "real" knowledge, beliefs, desires, and understanding, inhabiting the microchips. Anything that responds to varied stimuli in varied ways, especially if its behavior depends upon past history, is understood at a commonsense level in intentional terms.
-The most striking examples are provided by chess-playing programs. A good one elicits
+The most striking examples are provided by chess-playing programs. A good one elicits precisely the same kinds of comment we would use for a human player: "It is attacking the queen," "It's trying to get control of the center of the board," and so on. Yet no one doubts that the underlying program provides a perfectly precise and mechanical account of the machine's behavior{{note|3}}.
-But do machines really have beliefs, attitudes, and so on? ArenÃ¢â‚¬â„¢t we just begging the
+But do machines really have beliefs, attitudes, and so on? Aren't we just begging the question by talking about smart machines? There are two questions here: First, are there such "things" as beliefs, desires, and so forth? And second, if so, do machines possess them? There are two schools of thought on these questions: the first answers "yes" to the first question and "no," or at least "probably not," to the second; the second views the questions as irrelevant. Human beings have real desires, attitudes, and so on, the first view holds, and it is the business of real psychologists to study them. Sometimes attitudes and beliefs are deemed to be worthy of study in their own right. More commonly, perhaps, they are studied as causes of action; people do what they do because they believe what they believe. This approach leaves little room for work with nonhuman animals, tends to keep things at a verbal level, and attends first to the "meaning" of people's actions, verbal and otherwise, rather than focusing on the details of the
-question by talking about smart machines? There are two questions here: First, are there such
+actions themselves. This is the psychology of paper-and-pencil test, of interview, and of verbal report.
-The practical utility of this view cannot be denied. The power of advertising rests, in
+The practical utility of this view cannot be denied. The power of advertising rests, in some measure, on the correct assessment of people's attitudes to, for example, bodily functions and products that promise to diminish, enhance, or in some other way modify them. Nevertheless, it has both experimental and theoretical limitations. The experimental problem derives from the difficulty of separating correlation from causation. This is an old question: Do we run because we are afraid, or are we afraid because we run? "Fear" is a property of the subject's internal state, not something external that the experimenter can manipulate directly. Consequently, one can never be certain that the running and the fear are not both caused simultaneously by the same external conditions. The problem is not insuperable. There are ways that intentional terms like "fear," "hope," and so on can be made methodologically respectable and tied to observables. The theoretical question is whether the labor involved is worth it. The whole enterprise rests on
-some measure, on the correct assessment of peopleÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s attitudes to, for example, bodily functions
+the presupposition that familiar intentional terms such as "fear," "belief," "attitude," and the like form the very best basis for theoretical psychology. Yet our discussion of clever computer programs showed that such terms represent a primitive kind of explanation at best. They enable
-and products that promise to diminish, enhance, or in some other way modify them. Nevertheless, it has both experimental and theoretical limitations. The experimental problem derives
+someone ignorant of the details of the program to make some sort of sense of what the machine is doing. But full understanding rarely reveals anything in the program that corresponds directly to intentional terms, useful though they may be in the absence of anything better. It is rash, therefore, to base a program of psychological research on the assumption that intentional terms represent the ultimate form of explanation.
-Thus, the second answer to the question Ã¢â‚¬Å“Are there really such things as beliefs, desires
+Thus, the second answer to the question "Are there really such things as beliefs, desires and so on?" is "Maybe... but who cares?" Obviously these terms are useful ways of coping with some complex systems. But the "really" question is metaphysical, and we have no reason to suppose that these terms will prove especially useful in unraveling the mechanisms of behavior &ndash; which are what we are really interested in. Hence, we will be concerned with the behaviors of people and animals, measured pretty much in physical terms &ndash; that is, with a minimum of interpretation. This is termed methodological behaviorism, and is the dominant stance among psychologists and biologists interested in animal behavior{{note|4}}.
-Methodological behaviorism is not untheoretical; it simply takes no advance position on
+Methodological behaviorism is not untheoretical; it simply takes no advance position on the nature of appropriate theory. In particular, it does not presume that psychological theory should be based on intentional language.
 ===Two kinds of explanation===

Woozle: /* NICHES: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES */ cleaned up "smart" characters

2006-05-17T13:34:59Z

NICHES: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES: cleaned up "smart" characters

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Woozle: /* Contents */ slight reworking of structure; edit notes

2005-08-14T19:13:28Z

Contents: slight reworking of structure; edit notes

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	[http://psychweb.psych.duke.edu/department/jers/abl/Chapter01.pdf PDF]		[http://psychweb.psych.duke.edu/department/jers/abl/Chapter01.pdf PDF]

	=~~Contents~~=		=Chapter 1: The Evolution, Development, and Modification of Behavior=
	==NICHES: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES==		==NICHES: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES==
	Organisms are machines designed by their evolution to play a certain role. This role, together		Organisms are machines designed by their evolution to play a certain role. This role, together
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	(1911) and his student Konrad Lorenz (1935, reprinted and translated in Lorenz, 1970). Related		(1911) and his student Konrad Lorenz (1935, reprinted and translated in Lorenz, 1970). Related
	effects of early experience are discussed in [[Adaptive Behavior and Learning: Chapter 14\|Chapter 14]].		effects of early experience are discussed in [[Adaptive Behavior and Learning: Chapter 14\|Chapter 14]].
			=Edit Notes=
			*'''2005-08-14''' Figure 2 has not been copied yet; need better source, if available.

	=Edit Notes=		=Edit Notes=
	*'''2005-08-11''' Transcribed text by copy-and-paste from PDF version; one illustration retrieved by copy-and-paste, one illustration yet to be copied. Are illustrations copyrighted?		*'''2005-08-11''' Transcribed text by copy-and-paste from PDF version; one illustration retrieved by copy-and-paste, one illustration yet to be copied. Are illustrations copyrighted?

Adaptive Behavior and Learning/contents/Chapter 1 - Revision history

Woozle: cleanup from temp HTYP version

Woozle: TOC; some more cleanup, but not done

Woozle: moved Adaptive Behavior and Learning/Chapter 1 to Adaptive Behavior and Learning/contents/Chapter 1: main article should be about the book, with the contents in subpages

Woozle: moved Adaptive Behavior and Learning: Chapter 1 to Adaptive Behavior and Learning/Chapter 1: reorganizing with subpages

Woozle: 17 revisions: migrating from HypertWiki

Woozle: neededit template

Woozle: /* Two kinds of explanation */ cleaned up smart characters; transcribed italics

Woozle: /* Methodological behaviorism */ fixed "smart" characters

Woozle: /* NICHES: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES */ cleaned up "smart" characters

Woozle: /* Contents */ slight reworking of structure; edit notes